Introduction
For the conference that led to this paper, we were asked, "How big is too big?" in bank size. For me, as a more or less traditional industrial organization economist, this poses a particular challenge. From early in my career, I had drummed into my head the mantra of MIT's Morris Adelman, "Absolute size is absolutely irrelevant." 1 And what we appear to be addressing is in fact absolute financial institution size.
What Adelman was saying is that the core understanding of industrial organization economists, built up over decades of research, was that monopolistic influences on price-setting depended upon relative size --i.e., the size of the price setters relative to the market in which they operated. Pure monopoly is of course the extreme case: the monopolist commands close to 100 percent of the relevant market. Oligopoly is the case that has proved both most interesting in the real world and most difficult. The individual sellers are large relative to the market, and a few of them have sufficiently large market share, so that they are acutely aware of their interdependence in pricing. Given this size relationship, as economists from Augustin Cournot in 1838 to Edward Chamberlin in 1933 insisted, individual firm sizes sufficient to give the oligopolistic sellers a large share of the markets they serve were likely to facilitate prices elevated about the competitive level, inefficient resource allocation, and maldistribution of income. But this was not the main thrust of my assignment. I shall return later to argue that it may be more relevant than we might casually assume. absolute size does have relevance. There are at least three reasons why this may be true.
First, as every newspaper reader recognizes, financial institutions may be so large relative to the whole world of finance, regardless of their size in individual price-setting contexts, and also so interdependent in their relationships, that failure of one or more institutions has systemic consequences. That is, one large institution's failure, and its attendant inability to meet obligations to a host of financial counter-parties, can jeopardize the health of numerous other banks. And if many banks' credit "freezes up" as a result of these failures, the prosperity of the economy as a whole can be jeopardized. This is a real and serious problem, one known to economists since at least the time of Adam Smith.
Second, absolute size may carry not only this hazard, but it may also yield economies of scale and scope that make individual banks better able to perform their vital functions, providing credit to economic actors on more favorable terms. Whether this is true is an empirical question. I shall return to it, constrained to be sure by severe limits on economists' knowledge of such matters.
Third, financial institutions that are large in absolute size may have deep and well-filled pockets with which they can among other things hire lobbyists, support individual political parties and election candidates, and, under the recent Supreme Court reinterpretation of the U.S. Constitution's first amendment, mount advertising campaigns in direct support of or opposition to election candidates. 2 In Federalist Paper No. 10, James Madison warned against the political power of factions resulting from "the verious and unequal distribution of property" ... " who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." Robert Bork has argued that concern over the resource misallocation that comes from monopoly power in specific markets --i.e., relative size --was what primarily motivated the U.S. Congress to enact the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890. 3 Critics such as Robert Lande and I have argued that Bork's interpretation is 2 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (Supreme Court Decision, January 2010, details to be added).
3 Robert Bork, "Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act," 9 Journal of Law & Economics (vol. 9: 1966), pp. 7-16; and The Antitrust Paradox (Basic Books: 1978) , Chapter 2.
erroneous. 4 I leave for another forum the more detailed exploration of this debate.
Here I offer only one additional strand of historical evidence -- Figure 1 , drawn by artist Joseph Keppler for Puck magazine, January 23, 1889 --a year before the Sherman Act was passed. One cannot view it without recognizing that the U.S. public was alarmed at the time about the political power of the great trusts, for which we might now substitute bloated figures for JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, and Goldman Sachs. It would be hard to deny that public concerns over the trusts' power in federal and state legislatures were an important stimulus to the Sherman Act's passage. 5 And now, 120 years later, there is abundant reason to fear the enormous political power of the financial institutions, said by one writer to own Washington "lock, stock, and barrel." 6 In 2008, for example, the finance lobby is said to have contributed $475 million to political candidates and their supporting party organizations --more than twice the level of contributions from the second-largest lobby, the health care industry. 7 To be sure, an industry of relatively small entities such as farmers ($65 million in 2008) might amass large political contributions through the efforts of industry-spanning trade associations. But what evidence we have suggests that collective action groups such as the American Bankers Association were relatively minor factors in the torrent of political donations. 8 T h e S t y l i z e d F a c t s Let me proceed by laying out what economists call "stylized facts" --that is, parcels of evidence without direct theoretical or proven causal connections to the issues of bank size. I then proceed to examine what we actually know about causal links.
The first salient fact is that the banking industry has experienced during the past three decades a merger wave of monumental proportions. Dean Amel of the Federal Reserve Board staff reports that between 1990 and 2001 --i.e., before the mega-mergers precipitated by the 2008 financial crisis --U.S. banks consummated mergers and acquisitions valued at more than $900 billion. 9 My own attempt to determine what happened is best reported in two steps. The second step is embodied in Figure 2 . It traces principal events in the merger histories of six corporations that by the end of 2008 had become the largest U.S.-based financial entities measured by asset volume. 10 Altogether, 53 substantial components are found to come together into six surviving entities, ranked in order of end-of-2008 assets. The 1985 asset ranks of the merging entities are given in parentheses following the company names. Not all of the named survivors were the first movers in mergers that led to substantial consolidation. In four cases marked [circle L], another bank took the lead, choosing after consummating a merger to adopt a new name based upon the name of its acquisition target. The analysis was able to track only the most significant mergers. At the end of each surviving company trajectory is a number followed by "SM," for small mergers. That number was obtained by tracking smaller acquisitions reported in the company histories published in Moody's (now Mergent's) Bank & Finance Manual. It is probably incomplete, but altogether, 139 acquisitions too small to be accommodated in Figure 2 were tabulated. 11 Clearly, the industry's merger-based structural transformation has been profound.
A related stylized fact has been the increasing concentration of total U.S. financial assets held by the largest institutions. It is shown by Figure 3 , drawn without change from page 100 of the excellent book, The Road to Financial Reformation (Wiley, 2009) , by Henry Kaufman, former managing director of Salomon Brothers. 12 Until the end of the 1980s decade, there was a gradual decrease in the concentration of financial institution asset holdings. After that, a striking upsurge occurred. In 1990, the largest ten financial companies controlled a bit less than 10 percent of total U.S. otherwise be higher reported profits. It is hard to make an appropriate adjustment. A frequently violated rule of thumb on Wall Street was that 50 percent of pre-tax, pre-bonus profits were paid out as bonuses. Applying the rule literally would raise the trend line in Figure 4 to roughly 1.2 times the values shown. But the rule presumably did not pervade the entire financial industry --the focus of Figure 4 . Bonuses were undoubtedly lower for thousands of local and regional banks, many insurance companies, and the like. What can be said is that the bonus effect cannot have been insubstantial. In 2009, for example, the total compensation of employees at the five largest Wall Street banks alone was $114 billion, or 28 percent of the total profits tabulated in Figure 4 for pre-crisis year 2007. 15 End-of-year bonuses alone of banks located in New York City totalled $25.6 billion in peak year 2005, or six percent of total financial institution profits in that year. 16 And there is evidence that the compensation paid to financial industry employees generally --not just their top executives --contains substantial "rents" above and beyond what would have been required to call forth the services of equally intelligent, well-trained individuals. A study of pay received by three generational cohorts of Harvard College graduates showed that, after controlling for SAT scores, undergraduate grade point averages, types of graduate school degrees, sex, and other variables, those who worked for the financial industries received on average compensation 195 percent higher than their peers. 17 
A Logical Leap
One trained as I was in the structure -conduct -performance paradigm of the industrial organization specialty might view these stylized facts and reason, "Aha! Concentration of activity in the financial industries has been rising sharply. And so also has profitability. As in a host of prior structure -profit analyses, it would appear that higher concentration has led to higher profits." Indeed, the simple correlation between contiguous portions of the concentration series in Figure 3 and the profit series in Figure 4 is +0.71, with a t-ratio on the concentration coefficient of 6.57.
It is also well known that correlation does not prove causation. Here the warnings of Morry Adelman and George Stigler return to haunt us. The many published structure -profit analyses by industrial organization economists have to my knowledge never implied a causal relationship between aggregate concentration --the phenomenon measured by Figure 3 --and profitability. Rather, the studies show, and relevant theory supports, a relationship between profits and seller concentration relative to narrowly defined economic markets. If any sense is to be made of the observed coincidence, tighter logical links must be supplied.
The major profit spinners on Wall Street have not been the mundane retail banking activities for which Jimmy Stewart won fame in the motion picture, "It's a Wonderful Life," or that my childhood neighbor Ralph Claus practiced as president of the First National Bank of Ottawa, Illinois (still operating as an independent entity!). Rather, the big profits are said to come from investment banking --e.g., the management of new securities issues on behalf of corporate clients from every sector of the economy, the de novo packaging and issue of new hybrid securities such as collateralized debt obligations or credit default swaps, providing advice to corporations on such matters as mergers and acquisitions, and (perhaps predominantly, according to recent analyses of Goldman Sachs profits) speculative trading in securities, commodities, and foreign exchange on the institution's own account.
Many of these activities are subsumed under the category, "investment banking," as distinguished from more routine commercial banking operations. I learned as a student of finance at the Harvard Business School, and I have not in the past 50 years seen compelling contradictory evidence, that investment banking is a "relationship activity." That is, investment banks build up over the years relationships, both personal and reputational, with their would-be clients, so that, say, a company seeking to float a new securities issue or merge does not choose from dozens of possible financial intermediaries for support, but from a handful. In more technical terms, investment bank services are not the homogeneous commodity of pure economic theory, but a differentiated product --i.e., what Edward H. Chamberlin emphasized in his path-breaking 1933 book. 18 As a Fortune magazine author observed, "If Ford Motor Company wanted to raise $5 billion in debt from public investors, chances are that it would turn to Goldman Sachs to help it raise the money." 19 If there is truth in this conjecture, investment banking is not in fact a homogeneous blob in which aggregate concentration is behaviorally irrelevant, but instead a set of differentiated sub-markets, in many of which the participants recognize their oligopolistic interdependence. 20 The operating realm of such differentiated industries is called product characteristics space by economists. 21 Given that investment banking is relational and hence a panoply of possibly tight oligopolies in product characteristics space, it may follow that there is also significant product differentiation in the speculative trading activities that appear to be a mainstay of the major Wall Street institutions' profits. In particular, if Institutions A, B, and C have close links with the real-world companies that produce non-financial goods and services, they are also likely to have superior information on what the near future is likely to hold for those companies. There may also be specialization of focus in financial institutions' knowledge of particular companies and commodities. And given this superior information, the relevant institutions occupy a privileged position to trade profitably in the securities issued or commodities processed by "stuff"-producing companies. mean that many of the institutions occupying differentiated positions in the product characteristics space of finance have disappeared into the fold of other institutions, leaving tighter oligopolies in any given segment. As Blackstone Group CEO Steve Schwartzman observed, "The changes on Wall Street are immense. There are major players who no longer exist, and the remaining players are making more money because there are fewer competitors and bigger spreads." 22 And unless there is easy entry into the most profitable niches in that space --something that is far from evident --tighter oligopoly leads to greater mutual interdependence in pricing and bid-quoting and hence higher profits. Mergers among other things eliminate firms that would otherwise be what Joe S. Bain called the "most favored entrants" into relevant differentated market spaces, increasing, perhaps greatly, the length of time between the emergence of supra-normal profits, through simple oligopolistic interdependence or innovation creating new product niches, and the entry of competitors to dissipate those profits. 23 The result is increased oligopoly power and the higher profits that accompany it.
Indirect Evidence
This suggested nexus, I admit, is speculative. I have not worked on Wall Street except in isolated consulting assignments and I am not a financial economics specialist. Given my limitations, I consulted two fellow economists who have spent their careers studying the functioning of financial services markets. What I learned is that we possess a huge amount of systematic empirical evidence on structureperformance relationships in the commercial banking sector, but very little evidence on what happens in investment banking and related financial specialties. We know a lot about commercial banking among other things because the Federal Reserve Board collects extensive quantitative evidence on the structure of local banking markets, the details of banks' income statements, the interest rates banks pay to their depositors for various kinds of monetary instruments, and the interest rates they charge --i.e., their prices --on the local loans they make. This information has been analyzed extensively. On the other hand, there is an information void on the investment banking sector, in part because no federal statistical agency has been a position to perform Justice Brandeis' "sunlight" function 24 and perhaps also because the investment banking beast is so complex that its contours can be mapped and investigated only with the greatest of difficulty.
Lacking direct evidence, I turn for indirect enlightenment to the studies that have been done on commercial banking. In this effort I have been helped by a member of the Federal Reserve Board staff, who provided an extensive list of publications on the structure and performance of banking markets. 25 From that list I selected 16 items, later augmented, whose titles suggested the highest likelihood of shedding empirical light on relevant structure -performance links. The evidence can be divided into three main categories --effects of structure on pricing, economies of scale and scope, and merger consequences.
Market Structure and Pricing
The evidence that monopolistic or tightly oligopolistic local banking market structures lead to lower interest rates for depositors --by from 25 to 150 basis points --appears to be quite consistent. 26 Hannan's analysis suggests that the strongest structural predictor of lower rates is the market share held by the largest bank in a relevant market. 27 For Italy, however, concentration-increasing mergers were found to reduce consumer rates by about 13 basis points in the short run but to increase them by a similar magnitude several years after the mergers were consummated. 28 Two studies by Hannan also show borrowers paying higher rates in more concentrated local banking markets. 29 Erel reports lower lending rates following sizeable mergers, but when the mergers significantly increased concentration in locally defined markets, the opposite was true --borrowers paid higher rates, all else equal. 30 Peterson and Rajan provide a more nuanced picture. 31 In concentrated banking markets, they find, young (i.e., newly established) borrowers tend to pay lower interest rates for their loans. But they infer that the initial low rates are in effect bargains with which banks attract new customers into a relationship, after which they exploit their lock-in power to move the borrowers up to loan terms yielding higher-than-competitive rents. Cohen and Mazzeo add an additional nuance. 32 Focusing on market structure changes rather than interest rates, they find product differentiation and hence market segmentation among the offerings of conventional banks and thrift institutions. The effect of more local competition in reducing banks' profits tends to be higher when the additional competition involves similar institutions rather than cross-category banks. Thrifts (i.e., savings and loan banks) tend to be insulated from changes in the structure of proximate conventional banking markets, while the elimination of a local commercial bank through acquisition by a multimarket commercial bank reduces competition and (by inference) raises profitability, especially in the farming communities in which local market banks appear to have comparative advantage. It is well established that the existence of scale or scope economies can confound analyses of the relationship between market structure and profitability, although studies focusing on price effects (like some of those cited above) avoid this complication. 33 Several studies have shed important light on whether larger bank size yields appreciable cost savings or similar advantages.
Economies of Scale and Scope
The consensus of studies focusing on commercial banks is that there are indeed economies of scale, revealed inter alia by lower expense ratios for larger banks. However, the cost savings appear to be realized mainly through increases in bank sizes up to deposit levels of approximately $500 million --much less than the scale of, say, the largest 100 U.S. financial institutions. Beyond that threshold, cost advantages appear to fade or even reverse, implying an L-shaped or U-shaped longrun average cost function. 34 Citing related research by Federal Reserve Bank staff, Alan Greenspan observed in 2010 that they had been "unable to find economies of scale in banking beyond a modest-sized institution." 35 The only known study focusing on securities issuance and trading activities suggests average cost savings up to a threshold of roughly $1 billion in assets. 36 Two potential exceptions must be recognized. Because they are able to assemble larger and potentially more diversified portfolios of loans and other investments, larger banks might in principle be less risky and hence attract needed 35 Alan Greenspan, "The Crisis," paper presented at the Brookings Institution March 19, 2010. Greenspan goes on to note that the staff findings led him a decade earlier to state that "megabanks being formed by growth and consolidation are increasingly complex entitites that create the potential for unusually large systematic risks.
36 See Lawrence G. Goldberg et al., "Economies of Scale and Scope in the Securities Industry," Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 15 (February 1991), pp. 91-107. capital at lower costs than their smaller compatriots. McAllister and McManus explore this possibility with particular care. 37 They found that capital-raising costs decline more sharply with size than other costs, but only up to a threshold of roughly $500 million of total assets, after which constant returns to scale appear to hold.
This result puzzled me, since one might expect portfolio effects to persist, to be sure more gradually, at even larger scales. In my own 1975 study of multi-plant scale economies in twelve important manufacturing industries, I found capitalraising economies to persist out to indefinitely large scales, although for most of the industries they were only slight or moderate in importance relative to total costs. 38 And indeed, persistent capital-raising economies are suggested in a new study by James Kwak. 39 Kwak performs a multiple regression analysis on interest expense as a percentage of average bank earning assets for a large sample of banks and bank holding companies (excluding segregated investing banking operations) for the years 2004 and 2009. He found persistent interest cost savings of 16 to 20 basis points (i.e., 0.16 to 0.20 percent) for each tenfold increase in total bank assets, ceteris paribus. 40 For 2009 but not 2004 he also found a poerful capital cost saving effect for the very largest banks, which he attributed to the government's demonstrated willingness to rescue those "too big to fail" banks in adversity. It is unclear how much of this effect is attributable to paying lower interest on short-and long-term deposits, reflecting possible monopsony power, and how much to pure diversification. That the relationship was at least partly associated with diversification is indicated by his inclusion of a separate variable measuring deposit liabilities as a percentage of total assets. The variable was significantly negative, showing the lower rates paid on deposits relative to longer-term debt. 39 "Who Is Too Big To Fail?" paper presented at the Fordham University Law School at which the original version of this paper was also offered.
40 In my own similar regression for typically smaller industrial corporations, see note 38 supra, the comparable coefficients implied interest cost savings as a percentage of debt (a narrower measure than Kwak's) of 64 to 107 basis points with a tenfold increase in company assets.
It is also true from recent history that the largest institutions can allocate disastrously large segments of their investment portfolios to flawed prospects, creating the well-known "too big to fail" problem. On the whole, therefore, the advantages of diversification beyond scales achieved by, say, the largest 100 U.S. financial institutions appear to be either unproved or modest.
In a particularly comprehensive parallel survey of the relevant literature, Berger et al. identify a second advantage of large bank scale, highlighted in a study of merger effects by Fixler and Zieschang . 41 They find that scale-increasing mergers appear to have strong positive effects on the output side of the institutions' activities, that is, on their revenues, holding cost conditions constant (statistically). It is unclear how this result should be interpreted. On one hand, it could be seen as a consequence of superior monopoly power associated with greater size relative to particular markets, as we have seen earlier. Alternatively, it may mean that larger firms are better able to enter differentiated but concentrated segments of financial product characteristics space, in which, again, revenue enhancement relative to costs depends upon some degree of monopoly power. Absent further evidence, I infer that the Fixler and Zieschang result is not inconsistent with the interpretation I have drawn earlier.
Further Merger Effects
Many studies of merger effects yield evidence on cost efficiency similar to what has been reported above. 42 Here some additional findings are summarized.
From case studies of nine mergers selected because they "seemed relatively likely to yield efficiency gains," Rhoades found that most of the acquiring companies did indeed realize cost reductions consistent with their pre-merger projections. Many of the gains came from the elimination of overlapping office functions. The most common reason for failed cost-saving efforts was difficulty integrating electronic data processing functions.
Adams et al. analyzed the effects of concentration-increasing mergers on post-merger market structure. 44 They found that the more concentrated markets were post-merger, and especially the more mergers per se increased local market concentration, the more new entry there was subsequently into the relevant markets. They interpret this finding as evidence that "market forces might mitigate at least some of the anticompetitive effects associated with high concentration." 45 An extension of their interpretation might be that increases in concentration led to price increases, which in turn attracted new entry, or that service quality deteriorated following merger. 46 This explanation is consistent with results obtained by Amel and Liang for a non-merger context. 47 They found that high profits attracted new entrants, and (especially in rural banking markets) entry in turn reduced profits, though with a substantial time lag. Their inference is that a competitive process is at work in banking markets and that, if the high profits reflected only firm-specific efficiencies, one would not see entry responding to the profit signal.
C o n c l u s i o n
This compressed review of the literature on structure -performance relationships in banking reveals that structure clearly does matter. In particular, higher levels of local market bank concentration lead to lower interest rates for depositors and, with some complex exceptions, higher interest rates for borrowers. There are definite economies of scale and size in banking, but on most dimensions they are exhausted at relatively low thresholds, below the size of at least the 100 largest U.S. banking institutions. Indeed, the maximum threshold reported in all but the most recent surveyed literature --roughly $1 billion of assets, which might translate to $2 billion at today's inflated asset values --is surprisingly low. It is possible that scale economy thresholds in investment banking are higher than in commercial banking --the focus of most published studies. But on this point, our ignorance is considerable. Capital-raising cost advantages probably persist out to larger scales, although it remains unclear whether investors and depositors might avoid receiving lower interest rates without incurring much more risk by investing in diversified portfolios of smaller banking entities. To the extent that the received wisdom on scale economies carries over, it would appear that well-executed divestitures among the largest banking institutions would cause little in the way of lost economic efficiencies.
For one who has taught antitrust economics on and off for nearly half a century, divestiture is not an unfamiliar specter. But it is also one that is not implemented casually. As the Supreme Court observed in a 1951 antitrust decision, " [D] ivestiture is a remedy ... not to be used indiscriminately, without regard to the type of violation or whether other effective methods, less harsh, are available.." 48 Here a tradeoff must be recognized. When there is a serious failure of competition, at least in antitrust matters, it can be attacked through conduct remedies or through structural remedies. Conduct remedies have their own limitations. If they are imposed, compliance must be monitored --something, we recognized vividly when I was on the staff of the Federal Trade Commission, at which Washington bureaucrats are not very adept. Similar problems carry into the monitoring of financial institution conduct, as the massive regulatory failures that led to the crisis of 2008 revealed. The difference between structural remedies --i.e., divestiture --and conduct remedies is analogous to the difference in medicine between surgery and continuing drug therapy. With surgery, one hopes, the intervention is painful but brief, after which the patient lives happily ever after. Drug therapy is less dramatic, but must be monitored and adjusted continually. If the government is unable effectively to monitor the conduct of financial enterprises, and if, as even Alan Greenspan admitted after the crisis of 2008, market forces cannot be counted upon to do the job, divestiture may be a last but necessary resort. Since high financial institution concentration resulted from mergers joining what were once separate but mostly viable entities, reversing it may not be as painful as skeptics might urge. And as the studies of commercial banking scale economies suggest, the efficiency losses need not be formidable.
